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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On October 20, 2006, after a three-day bench trial, the trial court entered a final
order setting aside a Quitclaim Deed and thereby revoking Eugene and Zelma B. Davis'
partial revocation and modification of their revocable trust (the "Trust") by the
conveyance of certain real property to Russell Young. R. at 760-761. On November
13, 2006, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the above order. R. at 761763. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3,
this Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal.
II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Questions Presented and Standard of Review
1.

Did the Trial Court err by ruling that the Quitclaim Deed, which

conveyed the Farm to Russell Young, was invalid because it was not supported by
fair consideration?
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli,
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp, v. Utah State
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness.").
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant
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filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2.

Did the trial court err by ruling that the trustees and grantors/settlors

(Eugene and Zelma), did not have power to convey the Farm out of the Trust
without consideration?
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli,
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness.").
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the Quitclaim deed was not

effective to amend or revoke the Trust in conveying the Farm to Russell Young?
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli,
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference
2

because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness.").
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
4.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605

does not control the modification/revocation of the Trust because it is not to be
applied retroactively?
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli,
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness.").
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
5.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Eugene did not have authority to

execute the Quitclaim Deed and transfer the Farm on behalf of the Trust without
the signature of Zelma as the co-trustee?
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli,
3

861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness.").
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from the trial court's misinterpretation and erroneous

application of controlling law. Defendant/appellant Russell Young ("Appellant") is the
grandson of the Decedents Eugene and Zelma Davis. Plaintiff/appellee Steven R.
Davis is the son of Eugene and Zelma Davis, the uncle of Appellant, and the
current/successor Trustee of the revocable Trust created by Eugene and Zelma
("Davis").
On October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelma Davis each executed a Last Will and
Testament. (Trial Exhibits 4 and 7; addendum Exhibits A and B) (hereinafter referred
to as Exhibits A and B). On the same date, they joined in creating a revocable trust
called the Eugene Davis and Zelma B. Davis Family Living Trust ("Trust"). (Trial
Exhibit 10; addendum Exhibit C) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit C). The Trust
provides that it may be revoked "in whole or in part", under Article 2.01 subsection (a)
4

as follows: "While either grantor is living, the trust created by this instrument may be
revoked, in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by grantors or the survivor of
them, and delivered to the trustees." Article 2.01 (c) of the Trust sets forth the scope
of grantors' powers as follows:
The powers reserved by grantors under this article 2.01 are exercisable in
the absolute discretion of grantors and, excepting conditions of mental
incapacity, mental incapacity being established by written certification of
mental incapacity by two physicians who are not beneficiaries and are not
spouses, children or siblings of beneficiaries of this trust), neither the
trustees nor any beneficiaries hereunder shall have any right or power to
enforce or object to the exercise of such powers. (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the absolute and discretionary right of revocation of the Trust in
whole or in part, the Trust also provides for distribution of income and principal in
Article 2.02 as follows:
While either grantor is living, the trustee shall hold, manage, invest, and
reinvest the trust estate, collect the income therefrom and pay the
grantors, or the survivor of them, all, none, or such part of the net
income and principle of the trust estate as the grantors may determine to
be necessary for the medical care, maintenance, support, and reasonable
comfort in their accustomed manner of living.
On October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelmas each executed a Durable Power of
Attorney, granting to one another broad reciprocal power "to do and perform all and
every act that [he or she] may lawfully do through an attorney in fact, and every power
necessary to carry out the purposes for which the power is granted with full power of
substitution and revocation, hereby satisfying and affirming that which [his or her]
substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be done by [him or her]. Substitute carefully
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designated by virtue of the power herein conferred upon [him or her]." (Trial Exhibits
6 and 9; addendum Exhibits D and E) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibits D and E).
On September 5, 1997, Eugene and Zelma amended their estate by a codicil
which declared their intent to leave Russell Young $5,000 from their estate. (Trial
Exhibit 13; addendum Exhibit F) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit F). On July 11,
2000, Eugene and Zelma each executed an identical codicil to their Wills. The codicils
had the effect of devising to Russell Young one fourth of the remaining residuary estate
after payment of some small sums to other grandchildren. (Trial Exhibits 5 and 8;
addendum Exhibits G and H) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibits G and H). Pursuant to
the Codicils, the other three fourths of the residuary estate were devised to Eugene and
Zelma's children.
On January 1, 2001, Eugene executed a Quitclaim Deed conveying a parcel of
real property known as the farm ("Farm") to Russell Young. (Trial Exhibit 15;
addendum Exhibit I) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit I). The Quitclaim Deed
provides for conveyance of the Farm by "Eugene and Zelma B. Davis Trustees" as
grantor to Russell Young as grantee. Eugene's signature on the Quitclaim Deed was
notarized on the same date, but the Quitclaim Deed was not recorded at that time. TR
at 443. On March 21, 2003, after Eugene passed away, Zelma affixed her signature to
the Quitclaim Deed and had her signature notarized. TR at 217. The Quitclaim Deed
was recorded on March 24, 2003. At the time that Zelma Davis signed the Quitclaim
Deed, Eugene Davis was deceased and Zelma Davis was the sole grantor, trustee, and
6

beneficiary under the revocable trust. Eugene Davis died on March 12, 2003 and
Zelma Davis died on October 16, 2005. There has never been a certification of
incompetency by two physicians for either grantor, nor was there an adjudication of
incompetency prior to the trial court's ruling on October 26, 2006, a year after Zelma's
death.
This action was filed by Davis as successor Trustee to invalidate the transfer of
the Farm to Russell Young and otherwise determine the proper disposition of the Farm.
The trial court misinterpreted and refused to apply the correct law as to the
effect of the Quitclaim Deed in partially revoking the Trust and conveying the Farm to
Russell Young. Additionally, the trial court refused and failed to analyze and apply
Utah statutory law and give meaning to the clear intent of Eugene and Zelma Davis in
granting the Farm to Russell Young.
B.

Court Proceedings and Disposition
The trial of this matter was conducted over a three day period in the Eighth

Judicial District Court in Duchesne County, Utah in front of Judge A. Lynn Payne. On
October 20, 2006, following a three-day bench trial and a bench ruling, the trial court
entered a final order setting aside the Quitclaim Deed and thereby invalidating Eugene
and Zelma B. Davis's partial revocation of their Trust by the conveyance of the Farm
to Russell Young. R. at 760-761. On November 13, 2006, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal from the above order. R. at 761-763.
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C.

Material Facts
1.

On October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelma each created a Last Will and

Testament that were identical in their essential terms. (Exhibits A and B).
2.

On the same date, Eugene and Zelma joined in creating the revocable

Trust. (Exhibit C).
3.

The Trust provides that it may be revoked, in whole or in part, while

either grantor (Eugene or Zelma) is living "by and instrument signed by grantors or the
survivor of them, and delivered to the trustees." (Exhibit C, Article 2.01(a)).
4.

The Trust does not, by its terms, make the method for revocation set forth

in Article 2.01(a) exclusive, nor does it prohibit other methods of revocation. (Exhibit
C, § 2.01(a)).
5.

The Trust reserves to the Trustees a wide scope of powers, to be

exercised in the "absolute discretion of grantors" and prohibits the beneficiaries of the
Trust from enforcing or objecting to the grantors' exercise of such powers. (Exhibit C,
§ 2.01(c)).
6.

Also on October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelma each executed a Durable

Power of Attorney ("Power of Attorney"). The Power of Attorney executed by each of
the grantors granted broad discretionary power to the other to perform any and all acts
which either one could lawfully perform, including specifically the right to revoke the
Trust. (Exhibits D and E).
7.

On September 5, 1997, Eugene and Zelma amended their estate by each
8

executing a handwritten codicil to their Last Wills and Testaments, which amended the
estate, by leaving $5,000.00 to Russell Young. (Exhibit F).
8.

On July 11, 2000, Eugene and Zelma each executed an identical codicil to

the Last Will and Testament which had the effect of dividing the "remaining residuary
estate" by percentages among their three children and their grandson Russell Young,
with each receiving one fourth (1/4) of the residuary estate. (Exhibits G and H).
9.

Since the time of his boyhood, Russell Young had been raised by his

grandparents, Eugene and Zelma (TR at 396-398), and had worked closely with Eugene
in caring for, improving and managing the Farm. (TR at 398-403). Russell had
contributed much labor to the Farm and loved to work it with his grandfather. Id.
10.

On January 1, 2001, Eugene executed the Quitclaim Deed conveying the

Farm to his grandson, Russell Young, as grantee. (Exhibit I).
11.

The Quitclaim Deed identifies Eugene and Zelma B. Davis Trustees as the

grantor and Russell Young as grantee. Eugene's is the only signature for the grantors
on the Quitclaim Deed. His signature was notarized on the same date it was executed,
January 1, 2001. (TR at 617-618) (Exhibit I).
12.

At or about the date he executed the Quitclaim Deed, Eugene delivered

the same to Russell Young. (TR at 443).
13.

Eugene passed away on March 12, 2003. (TR at 843).

14.

Shortly after Eugene's death, Zelma communicated her desire to sign the

Quitclaim Deed and have it recorded. (TR at 453).
9

15.

On March 21, 2003, Zelma signed the Quitclaim Deed before Coralee

Sanchez, a Notary Public. (TR at 453-456). (Exhibit I).
16.

On March 12, 2003, the Quitclaim Deed was recorded. (Exhibit I).

17.

Zelma Davis died on October 16, 2005. (TR at 174).

18.

Zelma's mental health and capacity had been failing since approximately

1994. (TRat859).
19.

The trial court found that Zelma was not mentally competent at the time

she executed the Quitclaim Deed, and had not been mentally competent for an
indeterminate period prior thereto. (TR at 859-860).
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Effect of the Quitclaim Deed
The trial court refused to apply the correct law as to the effect of Eugene's
conveyance of the Farm to Russell Young. The trial court ignored or refused to
recognize that under Utah law, the conveyance of trust assets out of a trust operates as
a partial revocation as to that portion. Further, the court erred in holding that Eugene
had not substantially complied with a method provided in the terms of the Trust for
revocation. Lastly, the court failed or refused to recognize that Eugene and Zelma
Davis manifested clear and convincing evidence of their intent to revoke the Trust with
respect to the Farm when they conveyed such to Russell Young.

10

Eugene had Authority to Act Alone and on Behalf of Zelma in Revoking the Trust
The trial court failed or refused to apply the correct law to the facts of the case
when it held that, pursuant to Utah law, Eugene did not have authority to partially
revoke the Trust alone and on behalf of his wife, Zelma. Further, the court erred in
failing to recognize and hold that under the terms of the Trust, Zelma failed to act as
trustee and, therefore, Eugene was granted authority to act alone in revoking the Trust.
Lastly, the court erred when it held that the Power of Attorney was ineffective to grant
Eugene the authority to act and sign for Zelma in partially revoking the Trust. By its
error, the court refused to recognize and hold that under Utah law, a durable power of
attorney may grant an agent the authority to revoke a trust. The court confused the
issue, misread and misconstrued the Power of Attorney, and failed to apply the correct
law to the facts and documents of the case.
V.

A.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THE QUITCLAIM DEED WAS
INEFFECTIVE TO PARTIALLY REVOKE THE EUGENE AND ZELMA
B. DAVIS LIVING TRUST AND CONVEY THE FARM TO RUSSELL
YOUNG.
1.

The Utah Uniform Trust Code, § 75-7-101 et seq., Enacted in 20049
Applies Retroactively and Therefore is the Controlling Law With
Respect to the Trust.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3), of the Utah Uniform Trust Code ("Trust
Code"), sets forth various methods by which a settlor may revoke or amend a
revocable trust. These methods are: (1) by substantially complying with a method
11

provided in the terms of the trust; or (2) if the terms of the trust do not provide a
method or the method provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by (a)
specifically devising property that would otherwise have passed according to the terms
of the trust; or (b) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the
settlor's intent. These methods are in addition to any method provided for under the
applicable trust instrument.
The Trust Code made certain changes to the then existing common law and the
prior legislative provisions with respect to requiring strict adherence to certain
formalities in revoking and amending trust instruments. The Trust Code clearly
reflects the legislature's intent to liberalize and give more effect to the settlor's intent
pertaining to revocation and amendment. See Uniform Law Comments to U.C.A.
§ 75-7-605.
While acknowledging that a different result may have been determined under
§ 75-7-605, the trial court ruled that § 75-7-605 was not the controlling law governing
its decision because it was enacted in 2004 and therefore did not apply to the Trust,
which was created in 1993. TR at 827-830; 833. However, the trial court's ruling was
in error because it failed to recognize that the Trust Code was intended to be and was
expressly made retroactive and as such it should have controlled the court's analysis
concerning the Trust.
It is a general principle of law that the legislature, by explicit or implicit
language, can make a law retroactive. To determine whether or not the 2004 Trust
12

Code is retroactive in its effect, it is instructive to review the law generally with respect
to the retroactivity of statutes. In Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State
Tax Commission, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998), the Court stated:
. . .a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law . . . will not
be read to operate retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly
expressed that intention. The intent to have the statute operate
retroactively may be indicated by explicit statements that the statute
should be applied retroactively or by clear and unavoidable implication
that the statute operates on events already past.
citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988).
Therefore, with the general law in mind, and turning to the present matter,
under the Utah Uniform Trust Code § 75-7-1103(l)(a), (Application to Existing
Relationships), the Utah legislature expressly stated: "[ejxcept as otherwise provided,
this chapter [the Utah Uniform Trust Code] applies to: all trusts created before, on, or
after July 1, 2004." (Emphasis added).
Therefore, as the Utah legislature has specifically provided that the Utah
Uniform Trust Code is to be applied retroactively, it is the controlling law governing
all matters of interpretation regarding the Trust.
a.

The Execution of the Quitclaim Deed Substantially Complied
with the Terms of the Trust for Revocation.

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-7-605(3), a settlor effectively revokes a trust if he
substantially complies with a method provided in the terms of the trust. Black's Law
Dictionary equates the term "substantial compliance" with the "substantial performance
test", and defines it as follows:
13

The rule that if a good-faith attempt to perform does not precisely
meet the terms of an agreement or statutory requirement, the
performance will still be considered complete if the essential
purpose is accomplished.
Black's Law Dictionary, (8th ed., Thompson-West 1999).
At § 2.01(a), the Trust provides as follows:
While either grantor is living, the trust created by this instrument
may be revoked, in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by
Grantors, or the survivor of them, and delivered to the Trustees.
Although the Trust does not make exclusive the means whereby the Trust may
be revoked, the Trust does expressly provide one method whereby the settlors, or one
of them, may effectuate a partial or complete revocation of the Trust. To substantially
comply with the method provided in the Trust, one or both of the settlors must sign an
"instrument". According to Black's Law Dictionary, the term "instrument" is defined

A written document; a formal or legal document in writing, such as
a contract, deed, will, bond or lease . . . Anything reduced to
writing, a document of a formal or solemn character, a writing
given as a means of affording evidence. A document or writing
which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, for the
purpose of creating, securing, modifying, or terminating a right.
A writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act or
agreement.
Black's Law Dictionary, (5th ed., West 1979). (Emphasis added).
i.

The Quitclaim Deed Constitutes an "Instrument55 Within
the Meaning of Article 2.01(a) of the Trust.

Under the above definition, it is clear that the term "instrument" encompasses

14

deeds. A deed is a formal written document which gives expression to a legal act or
agreement. A deed can create, secure or terminate a right. The plain language of
§ 2.01(a) of the Trust provides that a proper method to revoke the Trust is to sign an
"instrument." It is also clear the Trust does not mandate that this instrument refer to
the Trust or state that it is revoking the Trust - it need only have the effect of partial or
complete revocation. Clearly, a deed fits the definition of an "instrument" and thereby
comports with the method provided for in the Trust.
Although the Quitclaim Deed does not state explicitly that it is revoking the
Trust in whole or in part, it is consistent with prevailing law that when a settlor has
retained the power to revoke a trust, and subsequently withdraws or deeds a portion of
the property out of the trust, the settlor has partially revoked the trust as to that portion.
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) § 330, Comment n (ordinarily a power to
revoke the trust will be interpreted as including a power to revoke the trust in part by
withdrawing a part of the trust property from the trust); see also Waldron v. Commerce
Union Bank, 577 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Tenn. 1978) (where court found that a settlor
sufficiently manifested her intention to revoke her trust - despite not using explicit
language of revocation - when she informed a bank trust officer that she wanted funds
transferred from her trust to her checking account whenever her checking account
balance ran low); Enoch v. Enoch, 2006 WL 1006648 *5 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (where
the settlor indicated another use for a specific asset conveyed in his trust, such
indication demonstrated the settlor's intent to modify or revoke the original trust
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agreement); Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 WL 563311 (Utah App. 2006) (where the court
held that conveying property out of the trust partially revoked the trust as to that
property even though revoking instrument did not refer to the trust or state that it was
revoking the trust).
Consequently, Eugene, acting pursuant to the power which was vested in him as
settlor and trustee, legally effectuated a partial revocation of the Trust by signing an
instrument (the Quitclaim Deed) which conveyed assets out of the Trust to Russell
Young.
ii.

The Settlors Were Not Required to Deliver the Revoking
Instrument to Themselves as Trustees.

The Trust also states that after the settlors/grantors have signed the instrument or
deed, the settlors/grantors are to deliver the signed instrument to the trustees. Trust §
2.01(a). As pointed out earlier, Eugene and Zelma were the settlors/grantors and were
also the sole Trustees. As such, by the act of executing the deed, the settlor(s)
effectuated a delivery of the same to themselves as Trustees. To require a formalized
second delivery to themselves is not realistic and is inconsistent with the intent and
purpose of the delivery requirement for revoking the Trust. The purpose of requiring
settlors to deliver a copy of the revoking instrument to the trustees is for the trustees'
protection, which the trustees may therefore waive. See 90. C.J.S. Trusts § 115
(2002); U.C.A. § 75-7-605(7).
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revoke the trust by any method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of their
intent. Utah case law is consistent with the principle that "the power [to revoke] may
be exercised by any method which sufficiently manifests [Grantor's] intention to modify
[or revoke] the trust." In re Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 594 (Utah 2003); see also
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Section 331.
In 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 WL 563311
(Utah App. 2006), addressed a strikingly similar case in which the settlor/trustee of a
revocable trust conveyed two parcels of real property out of the trust. The trial court
held that upon conveying the property out of the trust, the settlor/trustee's act of
conveyance revoked the trust with regard to those two parcels of property. Id all. In
affirming, the Court of Appeals stated:
It is undisputed that Bronn created a revocable trust. Accordingly, where
no specific method of revocation is required, she may revoke the trust in
any method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of her intent.
Where Bronn sold the property of the trust and deposited it into three
subsequent personal accounts without designating herself as trustee or the
funds as trust funds, the trial court properly found that she revoked the
trust respecting that property . . . the conveyance itself is an implied
revocation of the trust, since the trustee and the beneficiary are divested
of all interest in the property.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Additionally, the court in Boulton held that it was immaterial that the revoking
instrument did not specifically state that such would operate as a revocation. Further,
the court held that the trust was revoked even though the settlor/trustee signed the sale
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documents as trustee. The court stated that it was totally appropriate to sign as trustee
to assure the legal validity of the conveyance. Id at 2.
Here, the factual situation is nearly identical. Eugene signed and delivered the
Quitclaim Deed conveying the property out of the trust. He did not designate that the
conveyance was done for the benefit of the trust; rather, he conveyed the property with
little or no consideration thereby evincing his intent to revoke the Trust as to that
property. He also signed as trustee in order to ensure that the conveyance was legally
valid and binding on the Trust and because, at the time, the Trust held legal title to the
property. As such, the conveyance of the Farm, through the Quitclaim Deed,
manifested by clear and convincing evidence the intent of Eugene and Zelma to revoke
the Trust as to the Farm.
2.

As the Conveyance of the Farm Was Effective in Partially Revoking
the Trust, No Consideration was Necessary for the Quitclaim Deed to
Revoke or Convey the Farm to Russell Young.

A revocable trust is defined as: "[a] trust in which the settlor reserves the right
to terminate the trust and recover the trust property and any undistributed income."
Black's Law Dictionary, (8th ed., Thompson-West 1999). Furthermore, a "settlor may
grant powers to administer or appoint or withdraw trust property, during or after the
settlor's lifetime, to others who may be trustees or beneficiaries, or persons otherwise
unconnected with the trust, or may hold powers alone or jointly in fiduciary or
nonfiduciary capacities." Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 25 (2003).
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The trial court erroneously ruled that the settlors could not deed the Farm out of
the Trust because the Quitclaim Deed was not supported by fair consideration. TR at
832, 834-835. However, as stated above, the court erred in failing to recognize that
the deeding of a portion of the Trust assets out of the Trust operates as a partial
revocation as to that portion. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) § 330,
Comment n; Waldron at 675; Enoch at 5; Boulton at 1-2; 90. C.J.S. Trusts § 115
(2002). However, and notwithstanding the trial court's error, the Trust was effectively
revoked as to the Farm and therefore, upon revocation, the Trust neither owned the
Farm nor did the stated purpose for the Trust control over the disposition of the Farm
or any proceeds derived therefrom.
The court based its analysis and found support for its finding that the Quitclaim
Deed failed for lack of consideration by referring to the stated purpose of the trust,
which was for the upkeep and maintenance of Eugene and Zelma during their lifetime.
Trust § 2.02, TR at 832. However, the court ignored or failed to recognize that by
retaining full power over the assets and by retaining the authority to revoke the trust at
any time and by any means, manifesting clear intent, once a valid revocation of the
trust has occurred, the purpose of the Trust no longer controls the disposition of the
property. Since one of the established means for revoking a trust is to convey by deed
or otherwise withdraw a portion of the property out of the trust, once that property is
taken out of the trust, and the trust is partially revoked, the trust provisions and purpose
are no longer controlling over the revoked property and, therefore, consideration is not
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required for a valid conveyance.
The trial court erred, misinterpreted and misapplied the law by not finding that
Eugene's withdrawal and deeding of the Farm to Russell validly revoked the trust as to
the Farm and, therefore, no consideration was necessary because the disposition of the
Farm was not controlled by the Trust after the partial revocation.
B.

EUGENE DAVIS HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT ALONE IN PARTIALLY
REVOKING THE TRUST AND GRANTING THE FARM TO RUSSELL
YOUNG.
Under the terms of the Trust, the controlling law and relevant facts of the

record, Eugene Davis had the authority to both revoke the Trust and to grant the Farm
to Russell for and on behalf of himself and Zelma Davis, as settlors and trustees.
1.

The Utah Uniform Trust Code § 75-7-605(2) Allows Either Spouse to
Revoke the Trust.

Under Utah Uniform Trust Code § 75-7-605(2), "[i]f a revocable trust is created
by more than one settlor, to the extent the trust consists of community property, the
trust may be revoked by either spouse acting alone. . ." Id. "Community Property" is
defined as:
Assets owned in common by husband and wife as a result of its having
been acquired during the marriage by means other than an inheritance or a
gift to one spouse, each spouse generally holding a one-half interest in the
property.
Blacks Law Dictionary, (8th ed., Thompson-West 1999).
California courts have had opportunity to interpret a similar statute regarding
revocation of trusts by one spouse as to community property. Under California Family
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Code § 761(b), "[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise, a power to revoke as
to community property may be exercised by either spouse acting alone." This statutory
language is nearly identical with Utah's Code § 75-7-605(2). Further, in interpreting
California's law as to revocation by one spouse, the Third District California Court of
Appeals held: "revocation of a joint trust by one spouse is effective as to all community
property in the trust." In Re Estate of Powell 100 Cal.Rptr. 2d 501, 505 (Cal. App. 3
Dist. 2000).
Here, the Farm, before being conveyed to the Trust in 1993, was jointly owned
by Eugene and Zelma B. Davis. (Trial Exhibit 12; addendum Exhibit J). Therefore,
as the Trust property at issue consisted of community property, Eugene had the
authority under Utah law to act alone in revoking the Trust.
2.

Under the Terms of the Trust, Zelma, as Co-Trustee, Failed to Serve,
Thereby Allowing Gene to Act Alone.

Under § 3.01 of the Trust (Substitute Trustee): "If either of the above named
trustees [Gene and Zelma Davis] fail or cease to serve for any reasons, the other may
serve alone." The trust further states that only if both of the original trustees, Gene
and Zelma, fail or cease to serve, are substitute trustees appointed. Id. However, if
only one of the trustees, Eugene or Zelma, fail or cease to serve, then the other may act
alone. Id.
The Court heard testimony and specifically found that since 1994, Zelma Davis's
mental condition had deteriorated. TR at 859. In support of the Court's finding, the
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Court referenced Dr. Ripplinger's testimony and patient examination notes indicating
Zelma's mental health was significantly in decline. Id. Further, at least as early as
2001, Eugene expressed concerns to Zelma's physician regarding Zelma's mental
condition. Specifically, Eugene expressed concern about Zelma's flashes of anger and
her inability to make financial or other personal decisions. TR at 147. Not only did
Eugene have serious concerns but Zelma herself informed her physician that she felt
"she was slowly losing her mind." TR at 148.
Based on the trial court's findings that Zelma's mental health was in decline
from 1994, and based on the testimony of Dr. Ripplinger that Zelma and Eugene
expressed serious concerns with Zelma's ability to make financial and personal
decisions in 2001, it is apparent the trial court found Zelma was in no condition to
function as co-trustee of the Trust prior to 2001.
As such, in early 2001, Gene Davis, in an effort to carry out his and Zelma's
well established intent of leaving the Farm to Russell (TR at 77, 95, 101, 103, 202,
225-226, 237, 372, 376, 379, 383-385, 393, 407, 443, 453, 537-538, 546-548, 579),
prepared, signed, notarized and delivered the Quitclaim Deed to Russell. TR at 443.
As Eugene had serious concerns regarding Zelma's mental health which had caused her
to fail to serve as co-trustee, and pursuant to § 3.01 of the Trust, Gene lawfully acted
alone in partially revoking the trust and deeding the Farm to Russell.

24

3.

Eugene and Zelma Davis Executed Durable Powers of Attorney
Granting Each the Authority to Act for the Other to Revoke the Trust

The trial court erroneously ruled that the Power of Attorney was ineffective to
grant Eugene the authority to act and sign for Zelma in partially revoking the Trust.
TR at 836-837. However, the court confused the issue, misread and misconstrued the
Power of Attorney, and failed to apply the correct law to the testimony and documents
offered in the case.
Although Utah law permits either spouse to act alone in revoking a jointly
created revocable trust, and although Eugene had authority granted unto him to act
alone pursuant to § 3.01 of the Trust, Eugene and Zelma Davis went a step further in
manifesting their intent that either one, acting alone, could bind the Trust and each
other. They executed durable powers of attorney granting each other full power to act
in the behalf of each other to take any lawful act that the individual could take,
including specifically the power of revocation.
On October 27, 1993, Zelma Davis executed the Power of Attorney, naming her
husband, Eugene Davis, as attorney in fact:
I, Zelma B. Davis, of Dechesne, Utah hereby make, constitute, and
appoint Eugene Davis, my true and lawful attorney in fact for me and in
my name, place, and stead, giving unto him full power to do and perform
all and every act that I may lawfully do through an attorney in fact, and
every proper power necessary to carry out the purpose for which the
power is granted, with full power of substitution and revocation, hereby
ratifying and affirming that which his substitute shall lawfully do or cause
to be done by him or his substitute lawfully designated by virtue of the
power herein conferred upon him. If he should fail or cease to serve for
any reason, I appoint Steven R. Davis, and Patricia Ann Zufelt, acting
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jointly, to serve in his stead. This power shall not be affected by
disability of myself, either physical or mental.
Durable Power of Attorney for Zelma Davis, Exhibit E. (Emphasis added).
Although the Power of Attorney is unlimited as to its scope and purpose, it is
instructive to read the document in the context of the Trust, since it was executed on
the same day the Trust was executed and as part of the same estate plan. From the
plain and unambiguous language of the document, it is clear that Zelma granted to her
husband, Eugene, the fall power to act in her stead for ah purposes, including the
expressly granted power to revoke the Trust. Further, at the trial of this matter, the
evidence established through Stanley Morrell (preparer of the Trust documents), that
both Eugene and Zelma were instructed and fully understood that under the durable
powers of attorney they both had the authority to sign and bind each other on legal
documents. TR at 110-113.
The Power of Attorney grants broad and unlimited power to Eugene to act for
Zelma and includes express reference to Eugene's power of revocation. Under such
circumstances, courts have held that a general durable power of attorney grants an
agent the authority to revoke a trust, especially where the agent is given broad powers
over the principal's affairs. This is true even though the power of attorney does not
specifically grant the power to revoke the trust. In re Schlagel Trust, 51 P.3d 1094,
1094 (Colo App 2002). See also First Union National Bank of Virginia v. Thomas,
1995 WL 1055807, at 3-4 (Vir. Cir. Ct. 1995) (court held that agent had authority to
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revoke a principal's trust, where power of attorney granted such power); In re
Mosteller, 719 A.2d 1067 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1998) (Power of attorney included power to
revoke living trust, even without specific grant, given its broad general grant of power
and its specific language allowing attorneys-in-fact to deal with trusts).
In the Schlagel case, the court, in holding that the power of attorney granted
authority to revoke the trust, looked to the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the power of attorney. Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that at the same time
the wife executed the power of attorney, both the husband and wife created the trust at
issue. Schlagel at 1096. Further, the court pointed to the fact that the power of
attorney specifically included the granting of "full power of revocation." Id.
The circumstances pertinent to this issue are all identical in this case. Here, the
durable power of attorney is clear in granting Eugene authority to act in all matters on
behalf of Zelma. The power of attorney gives very broad and expansive authority to
Eugene to act in Zelma's stead. Further, the power of attorney was signed in the
context of executing the trust thereby evincing an intent that the power of attorney was
meant to be exercised in connection with trust matters. Lastly, the power of attorney
includes the specific language granting "full power of substitution and revocation."
Exhibit E.
Therefore, as the Durable Power of Attorney specifically grants Eugene "full
power of revocation", and as the Power of Attorney was executed in connection with
the other Trust documents, according to Utah law and case law throughout the country,
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Eugene had full authorization to revoke the Trust for and on behalf of himself and his
wife.
a.

By Executing the Quitclaim Deed for and On Behalf of the
Trust, Eugene Properly Acted for Himself and as Attorney
in Fact for Zelma.

The trial court erroneoulsy ruled that Eugene did not act as attorney in fact for
Zelma when he signed the Quitclaim Deed. TR at 836. The court ruled that if Eugene
was intending to act as Zelma's attorney in fact he would have had to sign the deed
twice. The court cites no law in support of its ruling. Further, the court refused to
acknowledge or analyze the effect of Eugene's preparation of the Quitclaim Deed had
on the effectiveness of the same for Eugene and Zelma Davis as Trustees and Grantors.
In preparing the Quitclaim Deed, Eugene set forth Zelma's and his name as
trustees and grantors, and then signed his name as acting for both him and Zelma. As
he was vested with "full power of revocation" under the Power of Attorney, he had
authority to act on Zelma's behalf to partially revoke the Trust as to the Farm property.
Courts have addressed similar situations regarding agents' signatures under
durable powers of attorney and the various effects of such in binding their principals.
In Kahn v. Royal Banks of Missouri, 790 S.W.2d 503 (Miss. Ct. App. 1990), the court
was presented with the question of the binding effect of a promissory note on a wife
and husband where the husband signed such on behalf of himself and his wife under a
durable power of attorney granted to him by his wife. The court concluded the wife
was bound even though the husband did not indicate he was signing in his
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representative capacity under the durable power of attorney. The court, in explaining
the binding effect of the husband's signature in light of a new durable power of attorney
statute in Missouri, stated:
The obvious purpose of the new statutory requirement that agents always
reveal their representative capacity is to let third parties know with whom
they are dealing. This purpose is served whenever a principal's name
appears on an instrument, even if an agent has signed . . . without
revealing the agent's representative capacity. . . [A] principal whose name
has been affixed to a commercial paper by an authorized agent is
personally liable on that instrument . . .
Id. at 510.
It is instructive to look at relevant Utah law with respect to the effect of an
agent's signature in binding the principal when the agent does not state he is signing in a
representative capacity. Under U.C.A. § 70A-3-402 of the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code, Negotiable Instruments, "if the form of the [agent's] signature does not show
unambiguously that the signature is made in a representative capacity or the represented
person is not identified in the instrument, the representative is liable on the instrument."
U.C.A. § 70A-3-402(2)(b) (emphasis added). Although this law has specific reference
to transactions governed by the UCC, it is relevant to gain an understanding of the
policy principles surrounding principal-agent relationships.
Here, Eugene prepared the Quitclaim Deed and properly identified himself and
Zelma as trustees and as grantors of the property under the Trust. As such, he
identified the person being represented and thereby gave notice to all third parties that
he was representing Zelma in his representative capacity. Kahn at 510. Then, after
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identifying the principals (himself and Zelma) he signed his name to the Quitclaim
Deed. As such, it is evident that he intended to demonstrate that he was acting on
behalf of himself and Zelma, as trustees and grantors, to partially revoke the Trust and
deed the Farm to Russell Young.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based on the above arguments, Appellant Russell Young respectfully
requests that this Court: (1) reverse the trial court's order that the conveyance of the
Farm to Russell Young by the Quitclaim Deed did not partially revoke the Trust as to
the Farm, (2) reverse the trial court's order that the Quitclaim Deed is void ab initio,
(3) order that the Quitclaim Deed was effective to partially revoke the Trust and convey
the Farm to Russell Young, and (4) remand the case for entry of a new judgment
quieting title to the Farm in Russell Young.
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